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GREEN TAXATION IN EAST ASIA1 
 
CHAPTER 1 – CONSPECTUS 
 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Expectations were high with respect to the COP15, Climate Change Conference to 
be held in Copenhagen in December, 2009. 2  Many hoped that it might resolve a number 
of the varied problems associated with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (COP3).  
The Kyoto Protocol was concluded in 1997.  It established binding obligations on all 
those countries which signed up, to limit green-house gas (GHG) emissions.3  Mostly it 
affected developed countries plus a range of “post-1989” Central-Eastern European 
countries.4  
The major feature of the Kyoto Protocol was that it set binding targets for 
37 industrialized countries and the European community for reducing 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this book (and the conference on which it is based), we have used the term green 
taxation as a shorthand expression to include: taxes, fees and charges – similar to traditional taxes, fees and 
charges – which are directed (at least in part) at generating improved environmental outcomes (some 
chapter authors have used slightly modified versions of this terminology).  By East Asia we mean that part 
of Asia including China, Japan, Korea and South East Asia – but not including the nations of the former 
USSR, the Middle East and South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and adjacent smaller States).  We have 
concentrated on particular key jurisdictions in East Asia for this book: China, Hong Kong and Singapore.  
China due to its combination or extraordinary size and even more extraordinary, long-term economic 
development is self-evidently crucial in any discussion such as this.  Hong Kong and Singapore provide 
examples of highly developed jurisdictions in East Asia which both face major environmental challenges.  
Each of them has, in its way (and for various reasons, not least, ethnic linkages and economic investment), 
been deeply influential in shaping aspects of development policy in Mainland China over several decades.  
(Limitations of space meant we needed to make certain jurisdictional choices.)  The other jurisdictions 
discussed have been included: (A) to provide a representative, comparative picture of the state of green 
taxation today; and (B) to let the experience from those jurisdictions inform the ongoing policy discussion 
about green taxation in East Asia. 
2 “COP15” is an acronym for “Conference of Parties, Number 15”.  The “United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change” (UNFCCC or FCCC) is an international environmental treaty produced at 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), informally known as the 
Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro from June 3 to 14, 1992. The objective of the treaty is to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogencic 
with the world climate system, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1353.php, June 3, 2010.  A continuing 
series of Conference of Parties has run since the Earth Summit.   
3 The key details of the Kyoto Protocol are summarized at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php, 
June 6, 2010 (henceforth “KP Key Details”). 
4 After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR these economies began re-engaging with 
the world in new ways. 
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GHG emissions. These amounted to an average of five per cent against 
1990 levels over the five-year period 2008-2012.   
The Kyoto Protocol was generally seen as an important first step towards 
a truly global emission reduction regime that would stabilize GHG 
emissions, and provide the essential architecture for any future 
international agreement on climate change.  
By the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, a 
new international framework needed to be negotiated and ratified which 
could deliver the stringent emission reductions the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has clearly indicated were needed.5 
The Kyoto Protocol placed a special burden on developed nations (Annex 1 
Countries (which includes Economies-in-Transition from Central-Eastern Europe)).  The 
Industrial Revolution had begun in these nations over 150 years ago and heavy 
industrialization was seen as the primary cause of the growth in GHGs, which, in turn, 
were seen as the primary drivers of dangerous anthropogenic (man-made) global climate 
change.6   
Developing nations, including large rapidly industrializing developing nations like 
China and India, were not subjected to the same sort of obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Certain developed nations, including the USA and Australia refused to sign up 
to the Kyoto Protocol – although Australia finally signed the Protocol, after a change of 
government, in 2007.7 
The primary means by which the Kyoto Protocol sought to reduce GHG levels were: 
Emissions Trading (the carbon market), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Joint Implementation (JI).8  There was only limited focus on the potential direct role of 
taxation as these primary means of, inter alia, allocating carbon-usage costs were being 
resolved.  The primary means have, as it has turned out, not proved to be very effective in 
                                                 
5 KP Key Details, op. cit. 
6 Ibid. 
7 McGuirk, R., “Australia Signs Kyoto Protocol; US Now Only Holdout” December 3, 2007, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/12/071203-AP-aus-kyoto.html, June 6, 2010. 
8 KP Key Details, op. cit.  
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 reducing GHG emissions since 1998 – not least because emission levels from major 
developing nations not covered by the Kyoto Protocol, such as China and India, have 
increased significantly.9  The arguably huge “fiscal moral hazard” problems associated 
with these UN or government run, “market-based” mechanisms aimed at reducing GHGs 
have also increasingly been argued.  We use the term fiscal moral hazard to mean the 
way in which markets (or market-related systems) created using formal legislative or 
similar instruments, in particular, are prone to being exploited for financial advantage in 
ways usually technically “within the rules” but also often contrary to the aims of the 
created market.10 
Great, indeed excessive expectations were placed on the COP15 Meeting in 
Copenhagen in December, 2010.  The serious, continuing impact of climate change 
(accelerated by massive and increasing carbon-based energy consumption along with a 
range of other aggravating factors) was widely acknowledged.  The “first commitment” 
period under the Kyoto Protocol (for Annex I countries) is also due to expire in 2012.11   
The COP15 Meeting brought together the widest range of key world leaders.  The 
hope was that the seriousness of the problems and the presence of key decision-makers 
could lead to real progress towards crafting a new multi-lateral agreement on tackling 
climate change.12  This did not happen. 
Serious critics of the mainstream approach to tackling climate change, like Bjorn 
Lomberg both predicted and noted what they said was the failure of the COP15 
                                                 
9  World Bank, World Development Report 2010 – Overview, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/5287678-1226014527953/Overview.pdf, June 
6, 2010. 
10 See, for example, Ng, E., “UN Probes Claim Firms are Faking Carbon Credits”, Sunday Morning Post, 
October 10, 2010.  A detailed argument of this view was presented in November 3, 2009 at the Hong Kong 
University (Campbell, I. D., "After Kyoto: International Welfarism and the Impossibility of Global Carbon 
Trading", notes on file with Richard Cullen).  Supporters of the CDM also acknowledge these moral hazard 
problems, see Nigoff, M. G., “The Clean Development Mechanism: Does the Current Structure Facilitate 
Kyoto Protocol Compliance?”, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Volume 18, 2006, 
page 249. . 
11 KP Key Details, op. cit. 
12 See, for example, “Great Expectations for COP15 Climate Change Conference”, 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres97_09.jsp, June 7, 2010.  The UN climate change negotiating 
process seems to have made some modest steps towards restored relevance at the UN Climate Conference 
in Cancun, Mexico, in December, 2010.  See “Back from the Brink”, The Economist, December 18,2010, 
page 113. 
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 Meeting.13  Christine Loh, whilst acknowledging the severe disappointments arising out 
of the COP15 Meeting, also notes the way in which the COP15 process has potentially 
helped create a new “tipping point”.  In particular the event showed, first that there is 
now a wide consensus that economies do need to become far less carbon-reliant and 
secondly, that the seriousness of climate change as a primary global issue was evidenced 
by the presence of all key world leaders at the COP15 Meeting.  She goes on to analyze 
why the outcomes at COP15 were so below par and notes, for example, entrenched 
(“locally vital”) views and the cumbersome UN discussion system.  She also sets out the 
now clarified negotiating positions post-COP15: there is a basic three-way tension 
between: (A) vulnerable smaller countries; (B) larger developing countries; and (C) the 
developed world.14 
One other consequence of the COP15 process is the way that use of taxation as one 
key means to tackle the manifest problems associated with climate change has begun to 
rise up the climate change, serious-discussion-agenda.  The Kyoto Protocol itself and 
what followed from it - not least the very lengthy debate about the position of “stand-
outs” like the US and Australia – consumed much climate change political energy.  Much 
of that energy, in turn, was then directed towards the quest of drawing a measurable 
success from the COP15 Meeting.  Despite the post-COP15 disappointment, one benefit 
of having gotten past this process is that the policy-options discussion has opened up. 
Lomborg makes essentially the same point (rather more polemically) when he says: 
 
After 20 years of wasted effort, we can no longer afford to squander more 
time continuing on this road to nowhere. We can only hope that 
December’s [COP15] failure will be the jolt we need to once and for all 
drop the Rio-Kyoto-Copenhagen approach and start tackling climate 
change effectively. 
 
                                                 
13 See Lomborg, B., “Technology not Talks will Save the Planet”, Finance and Development – 
International Monetary Fund, December,2009, page 13; and Lomborg, B., “Climate Strategy on a Road to 
Nowhere”, Globe and Mail, February 1, 2010. 
14 Loh, C., “Copenhagen is not Over”, December, 2009, 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres97_09.jsp, June 7, 2010. 
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 His primary point is that the best way to tackle climate change is by making a very major 
effort – significantly public-funded at the outset – to stimulate the highest level of 
research and development aimed at generating a green-energy technological revolution.  
This, he argues, would be far more effective – and far less costly – than the mainstream 
approach, which he characterizes as imposing crippling costs on carbon usage in likely 
doomed quest to achieve breakthrough GHG emission reduction targets.15 
As it happens, Lomborg does support, as part of his program, increased taxation of 
carbon usage – but at a far lower level than levels suggested by serious supporters of the 
Kyoto approach to allocating costs to carbon usage.16 
When we decided to organize the Green Taxation in East Asia Conference (GTC) a 
core concern was to focus on the potential use of taxation (and related) measures to foster 
climate-helpful, large-scale, behaviour change.  The true quotidian impact of climate 
awfulness is more apparent in East Asia than any other region of the world.  Greater 
China confronts severe environmental degradation problems as a direct product of several 
decades of remarkable economic growth.  In 2005 it was reported that 16 of the 20 most 
polluted cities in the world, where “you could chew the air”, were in Mainland China.17  
Since then the position has tended to grow worse.18 
No-one before COP15 honestly believed that any sort of “magic bullet” solution 
existed.  But many were persuaded that the fundamentals of the Kyoto Protocol 
comprised the core of the any “right approach” and alternatives outside that core were 
thought to be more marginal.  In the post-COP15 world, it seems clear that we will see a 
wider variety of measures designed to tackle climate change problems being seriously 
                                                 
15 Lomborg, op. cit.  Numbers of commentators have argued that Lomberg, in his new (edited) book (Smart 
Solutions to Climate Change: Comparing Costs and Benefits , Cambridge University Press, 2010) has 
changed his views so that he is now notably less sceptical about the argued consquences flowing from 
climate change.  Lomberg himself claims his position remains that we need to focus on practical remedies – 
rather than reaching for (vastly expensive) grand solutions.  See, for example, Rundle G., “Bjorn Again? 
Reshaping the Climate Change Debate”, Crikey E-Newsletter, September 1, 2010, 
http://www.crikey.com.au/2010/09/01/rundle-bj%C3%B8rn-again-reshaping-the-climate-change-debate/, 
December 28, 2010. 
16  “Frequently Asked Questions”, http://www.lomborg.com/faq/, June 7, 2010. 
17 Watts, J, “Satellite Data Reveals Beijing as Air Pollution Capital of World”, The Guardian, October 31, 
2005,http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2005/oct/31/china.pollution, June 7, 2010. 
18 Lee, H. Y., “Air Pollution Worsens from World’s Biggest Emitter Nation”, World Focus, March 29, 
2010, http://worldfocus.org/blog/2010/03/29/air-pollution-worsens-from-worlds-biggest-emitter-
nation/10170/, June 7, 2010. 
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 studied.  As this openness to a more multi-factor process unfolds, it is particularly timely 
to re-consider the role taxation-related measures can play. 
For the purposes of the GTC and this book, we have used the term green taxation as 
a shorthand expression to include: taxes, fees and charges – similar to traditional taxes, 
fees and charges – which are directed (at least in part) at generating improved 
environmental outcomes. 
A primary aim of the GTC was to generate an academically well grounded 
comparative study of the use and misuse of fiscal measures – especially green taxation: 
x To encourage environmental protection and improvement in particular 
jurisdictions (and across jurisdictional borders); 
x To discourage behaviour leading to environmental damage and degradation in 
particular jurisdictions (and across jurisdictional borders). 
We were also interested in the revenue outcomes of such measures – and the way such 
outcomes can, in turn, shape later tax and related policy – and social behaviour.  Our aim 
was for the GTC to explore the scope – and limits – of green taxation in depth 
 Since 2000, a widely attended and well respected annual Global Conference on 
Environmental Taxation (GCET) has been held.  To date, the GCET has mainly focussed 
on environmental taxation issues arising in the Americas, the EU and Australia.  Thus far, 
there has been no serious, detailed, comparative study primarily focused on the good – 
and bad – ways in which green taxation can be utilized in East Asia as one important 
means to try and shape collective environment-affecting behaviour.  The aim of the GTC 
was to address this space in the public policy debate.19 
The GTC – and this book - are fundamentally comparative.  Our aim is to inform the 
debate (as it relates to the use of tax and related measures) on meeting environmental 
challenges in East Asia by drawing on relevant world-wide experience.   
 
2.0  JURISDICTION CHAPTERS 
2.1 Introduction 
We invited a number of tax policy specialists and public policy commentators to 
attend the GTC.  They wrote and presented their papers at the conference and then 
                                                 
19 See further, re the GCET: http://www.worldecotax.org/.  
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 revised them in the light of conference discussion and further research.  Each of the 
following chapters offers a jurisdiction-based perspective on the development and 
operation of green taxation measures.  Each chapter highlights aspects of jurisdictional 
experience with green taxation, which relate to key, usually long-term, political-economy 
considerations particular to the jurisdiction.  In sum, the chapters address most all of the 
positive prospects - and limitations - in developing and applying green taxation measures, 
today. 
Our primary aim is to use a strong comparative discussion to help inform the 
ongoing policy debate about green taxation in East Asia.  For the purposes of the GTC 
and this book, we have chosen to focus, in East Asia, first on China and next on Hong 
Kong and Singapore.  Limitations of space have meant we have had to make choices.   
China, in view of its sheer size and remarkable economic growth – and 
extraordinary potential – is once again the fundamental key jurisdiction in East Asia.  
Hong Kong and Singapore are tiny by comparison.  But these two very successful 
jurisdictions faces major environmental challenges and they present interesting cases of 
differing approaches to using green taxation measures.  Moreover, they have each had a 
crucial influence on aspects of public policy development in Mainland China especially 
since the start of China’s “open door” policy around 1978.   
In the next part of the book, we have included chapters from North America 
(Canada and the US); the EU; and Australasia (Australia and New Zealand).  These 
jurisdictions have been incorporated: (A) to provide a representative, comparative picture 
of the state of green taxation today; and (B) to let the experience from those jurisdictions 
inform the ongoing policy discussion about green taxation in East Asia. 
2.2 China 
Dr Xu, Yan, from the Faculty of Law at Hong Kong University, faced some major 
decisions as she began writing her paper for the GTC.  China, the largest nation in the 
world with a population of some 1.3 billion, has so many environmental challenges (and 
ongoing, regular instances of environmental calamities) it was hard to know where to 
focus a single chapter for a book like this.  Ultimately she has concentrated her focus on 
the development of what she identifies as a consolidated fuel tax for China.  This 
discussion is placed within the context of a quite comprehensive review of the use of 
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 taxation and other, related, public policy instruments to address China’s manifest and 
always growing environmental problems. 
Dr Xu also notes some of the key “headwind factors” holding back a fully 
committed public policy assault on environment-damaging behaviour, not least, local 
government economic growth zealotry and the manifest problems related to central-local, 
public revenue distribution in China.20   
Dr Xu bases much of the analysis in her chapter on an essentially Pigouvian 
understanding of green taxation.21  Briefly Pigou argued powerfully for the need to 
“internalize the externalities” of economic actors.  By using taxes (and subsidies) market 
failures which allow economic actors “to pollute and forget” could be corrected.  
Notwithstanding significant criticism from other economic thinkers, Pigou’s key insights 
remain convincing for many.  These insights, as Dr Xu explains, laid the theoretical 
foundations for the application of green taxation in many countries around the world 
today. 
The focus on fuel taxation arises from several considerations including the key role 
of fuel, especially for transportation, in the growth of China’s vast new economy.  Fuel is 
also vital in terms of energy production.  Dr Xu has, however, taken a pragmatic policy 
review approach: she has narrowed her research attention so as to allow her time and 
space to develop a prescriptive investigation of how a consolidated fuel tax might be 
crafted and applied in China.  As she points out, direct and indirect taxation of fuel for 
transport is an area of public policy permeated by much ad hoc complexity.  Yet the 
fundamental need to build a more systematic consolidated system is deeply apparent – 
not least because of the prodigious growth in car ownership in China over the last 
decade.22 
                                                 
20 As Dr Xu, explains, in the Chinese unitary state, one has, based in Beijing, the central government.  All 
governments below this level – from provincial governments down to township governments are typically 
referred to, collectively, as “local governments”.  The Mainland PRC has long been beset by major 
problems – especially as between the central government and provincial governments – related to 
distribution of rights to tax (and charge) and rights to share centrally collected revenues. 
21 Pigou, A. C, The Economics of Welfare, (4th ed.), Macmillan, 1932. 
22 Some estimates are that there will be 75 million cars in China by 2011 – up from about 6 million in 
2000.  China now has more operating motorways than anywhere outside the USA.  The growth in car 
ownership – and motorway construction – are set to continue at high rates.  Meanwhile air transport and rail 
transport also are growing at remarkable rates.  See “Car ownership in China expected to overtake Japan 
next year”, People’s Daily Online, May 31, 2010, 
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 Key elements in the recommended reform of (transport) fuel taxation include: higher 
rates of taxation (to discourage excessive use and wastage and to encourage much greater 
fuel-use efficiency); environmentally targeted taxation (to encourage the use of cleaner, 
less scarce carbon-based fuels); market-tracking taxation (to ensure world market prices 
rises are swiftly passed on to consumers in China); and greater harmonization (and 
elimination of loopholes and anomalies) in the taxation of fuel.  Dr Xu also recommends 
studying how road-tolling – recently mainly abolished in China (see details in her 
chapter) – could be re-introduced using electronic systems to build an efficient nation-
wide congestion charging system. 
Dr Xu also discusses the spending side of the above new taxation equation: she 
recommends strong consideration be given to at least partial “ear-marking” or 
hypothecation of funds raised, for example, to redress environmental degradation; and to 
fund public transport infrastructure.  Increased revenues could also be used to reduce 
economically inefficient taxation. 
2.3 Hong Kong 
British Hong Kong was first established in 1841.  It became the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 
1997.  The reversion of sovereignty to the PRC proceeded under the Beijing proclaimed 
doctrine of “One Country – Two Systems”.  Under this doctrine, the HKSAR has been 
maintained as, essentially, a separate first world, remarkably free, “City-State”, within the 
fast developing but still heavily impoverished PRC with its deeply entrenched, one party, 
authoritarian system of government.23  The HKSAR has retained its British common law 
legal system and a wide array of civic freedoms.  The HKSAR, Beijing enacted mini-
                                                                                                                                                 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90860/7006415.html, June 10, 2010; and “China 
Transportation Growth”, Early Warning, http://earlywarn.blogspot.com/2010/01/chinese-transportation-
growth.html, June 10, 2010. 
23 City-States are typically defined as “an independent political unit consisting of a city and surrounding 
countryside”. They reached their peak in ancient Greece, although a number, like Florence, Venice and 
Genoa endured in Italy until the middle of the 19th century.  Bremen and Hamburg also retained this status 
until they were absorbed into the modern German State.  See http://www.answers.com/topic/city-state, July 
31, 2010.  See also Glotz, G., The Greek City and Its Institutions, Knopf, 1951 (reprinted 1969); and 
Ehrenberg, V., The Greek State (2nd ed.), Methuen, 1969 (reprinted 1972). Hong Kong is clearly not a 
separate sovereign State (like, for example, the City-State of Singapore).  As the HKSAR, it is now plainly 
a part of the PRC and subject to the sovereignty of Beijing.  Such is the level of effective political and 
economic separation of the HKSAR from the PRC Mainland it retains the appearance and de facto face of a 
City-State, however. 
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 Constitution, the Basic Law, does, however, attempt to retain (subject to a slow process 
of political reform) the essence of the largely non-democratic, “executive-led” system of 
government perfected by the British in Hong Kong.  The One Country Two Systems 
doctrine – and the Basic Law – thus combine great economic (and civil society) 
independence with significant political restraint.24  A crucial aspect of the separation of 
the two systems is that way in which the Basic Law has built a “fiscal firewall” between 
the Mainland PRC and the HKSAR.  Basically, the HKSAR is: to maintain its low rate, 
simple tax system; no PRC Mainland taxes are ever to be imposed within the HKSAR; 
and no HKSAR public revenues are ever to be transferred to Beijing.25 
The HKSAR has a population of around 7 million.  The total land area is 
approximately 1,000 square kilometers.  For a range of policy and topographical reasons 
the heavily built-up area of Hong Kong has remained at around 200 square kilometers.  
The result is a particularly high density conurbation in those built-up areas.26 
Professor Jeff VanderWolk, from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, explains in 
the introduction to his chapter that: 
 
After surveying the relevant legal and tax landscape, I will turn to policy 
proposals for the immediate future.  Specifically, I will argue that the 
Hong Kong government should consider introducing well-designed tax 
measures related to the use of fossil fuels in the energy and transport 
sectors, and to the use of water.  The benefits of these measures could be 
significant, including the broadening of Hong Kong’s tax base, a 
reduction of taxes on desirable economic activity, enhancement of Hong 
Kong’s competitive position in the region, and improvement of the 
environment. 
                                                 
24 The remarkable experiment of maintaining a energetic capitalism enclave within the largest (and most 
successful and durable) one party state in the modern world is matter of long established and ongoing 
discussion: the literature is extensive.  For a comprehensive review of the legal implementation of the One 
Country – Two Systems doctrine – and its political-economy consequences – see Ghai, Y. Hong Kong’s 
New Constitutional Order, (2nd ed.), Hong Kong University Press, 1999.  See also Cullen, R. “Hong Kong: 
The Making of a Modern City-State”, Murdoch E-Law Journal, Volume 1, 2006, page 24.   
25 See Articles 106, 107 and 108 of the Basic Law. 
26 See “Hong Kong: The Facts”, http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/population.pdf, June 
11, 2010. 
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Once more the analysis draws on Pigouvian insights.  It also stresses (drawing, inter 
alia, on considered arguments from the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)) the way in which carbon taxes (or green taxation) can be 
deployed to achieve positive environmental outcomes.  Well designed green taxes can 
operate both efficiently and flexibly.  Other well tried adjustment measures can also be 
used, as the OECD notes, to address problems of regressivity.   
Professor VanderWolk notes the well recognized narrowness of the tax base in Hong 
Kong; there are no formal consumption or capital gains taxes and the income tax regime 
is source-based; that is, confined to the territory of the HKSAR. Transaction taxes are 
generally low and the majority of wage and salary earners are exempt from income tax.  
The HKSAR Government relies heavily, directly and indirectly, on revenues related to 
land-transactions.  Especially in the post-1997 period, this income source has proved to 
be highly volatile.27  Base broadening measures have been more actively considered - in 
particular, the introduction of a Goods and Services Tax (GST).  But, as Professor 
VanderWolk explains, that initiative now seems to have been removed from the policy-
agenda altogether, at least for the foreseeable future. 
This chapter moves on from the review of the existing tax regime to consider what 
existing green taxation measures exist in the HKSAR prior to contemplating the sort of 
smarter, future green taxation measures Hong Kong should be implementing, including: a 
comprehensive carbon duty (affecting energy supplies, especially); enhanced taxation of 
motor fuels; and revised water and sewage charges. 
2.4 Singapore 
The other outstandingly durable and successful city-state established in East Asia, as 
part of the British Empire, is Singapore.  It was founded as a British enclave, more than 
20 years before Hong Kong, in 1819.  Today, as the Republic of Singapore, it is, unlike 
Hong Kong, a fully independent (City-State) jurisdiction – and has been so, since 1965.  
Both the population and area of Singapore are about 70 per cent of the HKSAR, at 
around 5 million and 700 square kilometers respectively.  Like the HKSAR, Singapore is 
a high density, small, first world City-State. 
                                                 
27 Cullen, op. cit. 
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 Singapore is a unicameral, parliamentary democracy which has been dominated 
since independence by a single party, the People’s Action Party (PAP).  The parliament is 
made up of a combination of elected and some nominated members.  Only the PAP has 
ever held government since independence.  Singapore retains much of the essence of the 
common law legal system introduced by the British but with some significant 
modifications – for example trial by jury has been abolished.  Singapore consistently 
ranks very highly in world-wide comparisons in terms of its infrastructure and stability 
but less well (including compared to Hong Kong) in terms of civic and political freedom 
and cultural diversity and the living environment.28 
One area where Singapore does excel is in the way in which it can mobilize and 
coordinate the resources of the State to drive new public policy development and 
implementation.  It, perhaps better than any other jurisdiction, has shown how to marry 
political will with effective policy action.  Its compact size, strongly perceived need for 
self-reliance, strong (and continuous single party) political leadership and extensive 
experience in facing and over-coming an array of governance challenges over more than 
four decades help explain this.29 
As Professor Stephen Phua from the National University of Singapore notes in his 
chapter, Singapore determined some time ago that it must take GHG emissions seriously.   
Having made that decision, the City-State has put a major effort into developing and 
implementing an array of medium to long-term, responsive policies.  Thus, policies have 
been developed to secure long-term, sustainable supplies of water and gas (for electricity) 
from Malaysia and Indonesia, respectively.  Major initiatives have been launched, too, to 
enhance the “greening” of Singapore’s built environment: new building codes governing 
current developments and the upgrading of existing buildings have also been targeted.  
These changes are noted in the Singapore chapter, below, but the main focus in the 
chapter is on the variety of ways the City-State has set about reforming the mix and 
operation of its entire approach to regulating internal transportation. 
                                                 
28 Lim, J., “'Software' Areas Hurt Singapore Ranking in Global City Poll”, Straits Times, February 13, 
2010, http://wildsingaporenews.blogspot.com/2010/02/software-areas-hurt-singapore-ranking.html, June 
11, 2010.  This article refers to recent detailed comparative by organizations such as The Economist 
Intelligence Unit and International Living. 
29 See Vasil R., Governing Singapore: A History of National Development and Democracy, Allen & Unwin 
Academic, 2001; and “Economic History”, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore, 
http://app.mti.gov.sg/default.asp?id=545, July 28, 2010. 
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 Briefly, Singapore has crafted (and is still creating) a strong mix of often inter-
linked policies designed: to limit the growth in private car ownership; encourage low-
emission commercial and private road vehicles, reduce road congestion; and rapidly 
expand the public rail and road transportation system.  Serious funding research modeling 
has been undertaken to show how these programs can be paid for.  Additional research on 
tax and charging systems has been done to show where to target fees so that they produce 
the greatest (green-friendly) behaviour change.    
Although Singapore’s per capita car ownership rate is only about 20 per cent  of that 
in Australia, it is still around double the rate in Hong Kong.30  High initial purchase-
related charges and a (usually) expensive “Certificate of Entitlement” (COE) scheme has, 
however, helped hold that annual ownership growth rate to less than 2 per cent in 
Singapore.  A combination of prohibitions on high pollution vehicles and fuel pricing and 
other schemes have made the use of cleaner fuels, especially for commercial vehicles, all 
but mandatory.  “Off peak” registration of private cars has been introduced, too, to 
encourage non-use during peak periods. 
Most effective of all, perhaps, in shaping better road usage behaviour has been the 
extensive deployment of Electronic Road Pricing (ERP).  ERP currently applies to the 
busiest areas in the City-State but the system appears to have been so successful in 
reducing congestion (and modifying usage patterns) that it looks set to be expanded, 
perhaps right across Singapore. 
Unlike Hong Kong, Singapore has a Goods and Services Tax (GST) which has 
become a key revenue source.  Funds flowing from the GST and a number of other 
sources, including the COE scheme, are now “quasi-ear-marked” to fund the planned 
massive increase in the public transport system (which includes a doubling of rail-based, 
public transport service provision).  Singapore’s integrated policy implementation 
process does not just envision increased public transport as a “fuzzy green plus” – it sees 
this as a “must have” factor to complement the transition to a notably lower level of 
private car usage (if not ownership).  The aim is that by 2020, individual daily transits 
will average 70 per cent by public transport systems – up from 59 per cent today.  
                                                 
30 See “Passenger Cars per 1,000 People”, World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.VEH.PCAR.P3, July 28, 2010.  
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 Singapore is also trying to foster increased bicycle usage as part of the reform mix.  
Given the compact nature of the city, the generally flat terrain plus the health benefits 
arising from the exercise involved in cycling, this makes sense.  The plans so far include 
creating dedicated cycling paths on a limited scale.31 
Another crucial aspect of such integrated policy-making is that significant 
commercial opportunities are envisaged from this mass transition – across the economy – 
to much enhanced energy efficiency.  The sorts of systems, technical hardware, 
manufacturing processes and so on, being developed, can, it is reasoned, be packaged for 
export.  A key substantial, export market – where some Singapore energy enhancing 
systems are already being tested – is Mainland China. 
Singapore’s particular combination of political, economic, social and geographic 
factors set it apart.  That said, the City-State does seem to provide some serious guidance 
on how, where there is real political will coupled with adequate resources, strong, 
considered policy making can tackle, at a local level, the huge challenge of GHG 
emissions, using a multi-factor approach.  And it can do so in a way which offers the 
potential to build a robust platform for developing an array of sturdy commercial 
applications.  
2.4 United States of America 
The United States of America (US), population over 300 million, is the single most 
dominant economy in the world and also the world’s second greatest contributor to GHG 
emissions overall (after China) and the most significant contributor on a per capita 
basis32.  As with the case of China, it is basically mandatory to include in a book of this 
type, a review of the experience with green taxation in the US.  First, the US is simply so 
economically and environmentally important according to any global measure.  Next due 
to its long-term, extensive policy development experience, the US is in a special position 
to offer lessons (both good and bad) based on its own policy building history. 
Professor Janet Milne, from Vermont Law School in the US like many of our 
authors, begins her chapter with an analysis of the influence of Pigouvian theory on the 
                                                 
31 See “Cycling in Singapore”, July 23, 2010, http://cyclinginsingapore.blogspot.com/, July 29, 2010. 
32 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, “Which are the Top-20 CO2 or GHG Emitting 
Countries?”, 
http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/FAQs/index.html?vraag=10&title=Which%20are%20the%20
top-20%20CO2%20or%20GHG%20emitting%20countries%3F#10, June 11, 2010.  
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 use of public policy instruments to shape environment-affecting behaviour.  As she 
makes clear, much public policy aimed at rectifying particular sorts of “market failure” 
with market economies, builds on the key Pigouvian insight that: 
 
[It is] possible for the State, if it so chooses, to remove the divergence in 
any field [between trade and social net product] by “extraordinary 
encouragements” or “extraordinary restraints” upon investment in that 
field [giving taxation is an example].33  
 
Professor Milne concentrates on the “main game in town” – the federal tax regime.  
She spends considerable time usefully reviewing the US experience with green taxation.  
She pays particular attention to the use of “tax expenditures” as well as the imposition of 
taxes and charges and the uses of revenues derived there-from.  Environmental tax 
expenditures – that is, system-granted tax concessions aimed at prompting certain kinds 
of environmentally positive, economic activity – have, as she explains, regularly been 
deployed in the US.  Large scale environment-based taxation measures have often proved 
difficult to enact.  The example of President Clinton’s failed attempt to introduce a broad-
based energy tax in 1993 is mentioned.  Other measures, introduced at a particularly “ripe 
time”, perhaps, such as the 1978 tax on “gas guzzling” cars have become law, however. 
The US, as the world largest, richest and most diverse, fully federal system presents 
itself as a very special case, in many ways.  Private wealth, great diversity, multitudes of 
energized special interests and a federally divided power structure are some of the factors 
which need to be taken account of when considering major policy changes in the US.  
These many factors rarely make for smooth implementation of new policy initiatives. 
Yet, out of this very rich political experience some strong lessons emerge.  Professor 
Milne summarizes these well.  Firstly, taxation based measures – and especially taxation 
impositions – are almost always the hardest of all policy instruments to use in a day-to-
day political sense.  Prima facie, the voting public does not like new or increased taxes.  
This maxim applies to environmental taxes, too.  Although, as Professor Milne notes, 
there are various aspects of green taxes which can be used to help persuade citizens 
                                                 
33 Pigou, op.cit., page 168. 
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 towards acceptance, including the direct environmental good they may secure and the 
way green taxation revenue can be ear-marked for spending to generate positive 
environmental outcomes. 
Environmental tax expenditures are notably less transparent and their fiscal impact 
is much more obscure to the average citizen.  But these “advantages”, as Professor Milne 
notes, often makes their positive impact much more difficult to judge.  They can also 
readily lead to adverse “unforeseen consequences” as taxpayers “game the system” (as 
taxpayers are inclined to do).  Next, once they are in place, a (self-serving) constituency 
can swiftly grow to lobby for their retention even if their policy impact is limited or 
negative. 
Janet Milne notes that environmentally focused, direct regulatory instruments 
outside of the tax system altogether are the most likely to leave their full range of impacts 
disguised. 
Professor Milne stresses the need to test the effectiveness of all policy measures 
which set off into the real world waving an environment-friendly flag: whether they 
comprise direct environmental regulation, tax expenditures or tax impositions.  She also 
notes the need to recognize that environmental problems are often multi-faceted.  It 
follows that solutions will often need to deploy multiple instruments.  These lessons do 
seem to have genuine universal resonance. 
Professor Milne concludes by suggesting that green taxation is likely to play a role 
as the world tackles the task of reducing GHG emissions – but that the scope of that role 
is yet to be resolved.  Her chapter makes clear, that given the immense difficulties 
associated with using increased or new taxation measures, generally, in America, the role 
of green taxation looks set to be heavily constrained in future US policy development.  
This lesson may, however, be more a lesson for the US than a message of more universal 
significance.  Taxpayers everywhere are usually hostile to new or more taxation.  But 
modern experience outside of the US shows that advanced democracies can be persuaded 
to accept major new taxation initiatives as the introduction of new GST regimes in New 
Zealand (1986) Canada (1991) and Australia (2000) over the last 25 years demonstrates. 
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 2.6  Canada 
Canada is the second largest economy in North America.  Canada joined the Group 
of Seven (G7) (as it became) in 1976.34  Notwithstanding this international standing, 
Professor Arthur Cockfield, of Queen’s University in Canada, identifies Canada as a 
“small open economy”.  This is an accurate characterization.  With a population of 
around 35 million it is less than 12 per cent of the size of the US.  Canada is also 
comfortably the smallest member of the (now) G8 in terms of population. 
Professor Cockfield argues that small open economies are best advised to seek and 
foster international collective action in the quest to reduce GHG emissions and lessen the 
adverse impact of climate change.  Canada, however, has, he argues, failed, on the whole, 
to adopt such an approach.  Canada is a comparatively resource rich country and it is, 
within the Western World, well endowed with carbon-based natural resources.  The drive 
to exploit those resources both for domestic use and export has, thus far, tended to 
dominate the policy-setting agenda. 
Professor Cockfield writes in his conclusion that Canada continues to struggle to 
find an appropriate response to concerns about global warming (notwithstanding certain 
green taxation initiatives at the provincial level of government).  Implicit in this 
observation is the supposition that Canada is also constrained in its approach to green 
taxation in general.  The factors which explain this include: 
 
[F]ears that a significant curtailment of emissions by, say, a carbon tax 
will reduce economic growth and employment.  Moreover, there are 
reasons fairly unique to the Canadian situation that may help to explain 
Canadian reluctance to enact a broad-based carbon tax.  For example, 
Canada is a northern country and the second largest country in the world 
with significant exploitable carbon resources.  As a result, despite the 
growing academic and policy views that carbon taxes are best suited to 
                                                 
34 The Group of Six (G6) countries was initially an ad hoc forum established by France in 1975 for the 
governments of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.  It was subsequently institutionalized.  
It became the G7 when Canada joined in 1976 and the G8 when Russia joined in 1998.  It was conceived as 
a forum comprising the major advanced democracies formed after the first “oil shock” in 1973.  See further 
“The History of the G7 Summit: The Importance of American Leadership”, 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/annual/bayne1997/document.html, June 11, 2010.   
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 reducing these emissions, the Canadian government is currently 
supporting a cap and trade system (similar to the proposed U.S. 
approach) that will likely permit certain firms to maintain high emissions 
for some time.   
 
Canada, like the US, also has a federal system of government.  Canada’s much 
smaller size reduces the complexity arising therefrom compared to the US.  But Canada’s 
federal system adds a special complexity of its own related, primarily, to the presence of 
the Province of Quebec within that system.  Quebec has a strong sense of separate 
identity bolstered, not least, from having French as its first language.  Other Provinces in 
Canada, in both the west and east of the country have not infrequently, taking a lead from 
Quebec, tended to stress their own separate identities.  Historically, this has often 
predisposed Canada to special difficulties in crafting taxation and other policies related to 
energy resources.35   
Professor Cockfield further demonstrates how yet more limits are placed on what 
may be possible in terms of green taxation initiatives because of the way the Canadian 
economy it so closely intertwined with the US economy,  Many mainstream Canadian 
policy makers believe that in order to maintain the vital cross-border trade and 
investment with the US, the Canadian tax system, inter alia, cannot move significantly 
away from the fundamental tax framework obtaining in the US. 
2.7 European Union 
The European Union (EU) was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 
building upon the long process of post World War 2, cross-national political-community 
building which began in Western Europe with the establishment of the European Coal 
and Steel Community in 1951.36  The EU does not qualify to be called a federation as this 
term is commonly understood.  Yet it is far more than a free trade association or some 
type of purely international association of Nation States.  It is has its own array of 
                                                 
35 See, for example, Cullen, R., “Canada and Australia: A Federal Parting of Ways,” Federal Law Review, 
Volume 18, 1989, page 53. 
36 “European Union”, CIA – The World Fact Book,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ee.html, June 12, 2010.  
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 significant executive, legislative and judicial institutions, its own currency and anthem 
and flag, for example.37   
The EU is a unique political entity, one which now has 27 distinct Nation States as 
members, a population of over 500 million and, if taken in totality, it comprises the single 
largest economy in the world.  The EU is, to an extent, a single economy but, even more 
so, it remains an agglomeration of 27 still separated economies.38 
In their chapter looking at the EU experience with green taxation, Mattias Derlen 
and Johan Lindholm, from Umea University in Sweden, provide a clear analysis of why 
the evolved EU structure has, to a significant extent, reduced the role which taxation can 
play in addressing environmental challenges.  The problem, as they describe it, is, first, 
that the highly complex EU structure largely places direct taxation measures outside of 
the scope of (centralized) EU decision-making: control of taxation is primarily left with 
the EU Member States.   
Next, however, the EU has an overarching commitment to maximizing economic 
harmonization within the EU as one of its core functions.  The quest to achieve this 
imposes real restrictions on how Member States may deploy their taxation powers.  Thus, 
there is an EU-wide ban on discriminatory or protective taxes which could adversely 
affect the EU internal free market.  Taxes which might be introduced at the national level 
with the best intentions in terms of environment-enhancement can still readily be 
challenged in court with a real risk that they may be struck down in part or altogether for 
violating the EU-wide harmonizing exhortations just noted. 
Non-tax measures directly aimed at environment protection can also swiftly fall foul 
of the stipulation that, prima facie, trade must not be impeded.  Thus, in the Danish 
Bottles case, the European Court of Justice found that environmental protection could 
justify imposing certain obstacles to trade – but any such obstacles had to be 
proportionate and, in this case, they were not.39 
The two authors provide an array of examples in their chapter of the genuine 
difficulties which the EU’s constitutional structure has imposed on both taxation-based 
and other regulatory measures designed to achieve environment-friendly outcomes.  They 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Case 302/86, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark [1988] ECR, 4607. 
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 conclude by noting that, without question, implementing green taxes at the EU level is 
notably more difficult than using non-tax-based EU measures to foster stronger 
protection of the environment.   
At the national level, the reverse is generally true; the EU Member States can 
develop and apply green taxes.  But they still will need to be well crafted and 
administered to ensure that they do not breach any aspects of the wide assortment of EU 
directives aimed at preventing discriminatory or protective taxation.  The authors note, in 
this regard, that Sweden’s own carbon tax, which has operated since 1991, has proved 
that national green taxes can work within the EU constitutional framework.  This tax has 
survived Sweden’s admission to the EU in 1995.  (In fact, the impact of this relatively 
early carbon tax has, overall, been reduced over the time since its inception through the 
introduction of special exemptions for certain export-focused industries.) 
After reading the chapters on the EU and the US, there is a similar impression that 
the EU and the US are rather special cases where the deployment of green taxation 
measures may be more constrained than elsewhere in the developed world – 
fundamentally because of the political, size-complexity factors applying. 
2.8 Australia 
Australia, like the US and Canada, has what can be termed a classical federal system 
of government.  The central or federal government is based in Canberra.  Both the federal 
government and the six constituent States with which it co-exists are constitutionally 
entrenched entities.  However, Australia has a federal system where the central 
government is the overwhelmingly dominant political entity within the federation.  This 
centralizing tendency gathered serious momentum as the nation – and the High Court of 
Australia – responded to the impact of the First World War and its immediate 
aftermath.40  It is a process which has been steadily sustained since that time.41  In 2006, 
in the Work Choices case, certain remaining major constraints on federal government 
power (the limitation of what sort of activities undertaken by corporations could be 
federally regulated) were largely lifted.42   
                                                 
40 Galligan, B., Politics of the High Court, University of Queensland Press, 1987. 
41 Ibid.  See also Cullen, R., “Australian Federalism: Its Provenance and Its Prognosis” in P. Häberle, 
Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1992, page 723. 
42 New South Wales v Commonwealth of Australia [2006] HCA 52. 
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 One commentator put the standing of the Australian federal system, post the Work 
Choices case, in this way: 
 
In conclusion, the Court’s endorsement [in the Work Choices case] of an 
object of command test, the support it gives to laws that regulate the 
activities of constitutional corporations, and the expansive approach 
which it adopted to the validity of laws that regulate those whose conduct 
is or “is capable of affecting” the activities, functions, relationships or 
business of a constitutional corporation equips the Commonwealth with 
power to regulate across an enormous range of subject matters, given the 
ubiquitous role of corporations in our daily lives. The issue is not whether 
the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to regulate, but whether 
it has the political desire and will to do so.43 
 
Australia is, then, notably less beset by the division of power complexities evident in 
the federal systems in Canada and the US, discussed above.  As the joint authors of the 
chapter on Australia (Professor Natalie Stoianoff (University of Technology, Sydney) 
and Wayne Gumley (Monash University, Melbourne) show, however, this comparative 
enhancement of central power has not produced a well focused, environmentally positive 
approach to green taxation. 
To be fair, the very complex tax (and tax expenditure) infrastructure put in place in 
Australia has taken decades to construct.  And for much of the time that this rather 
amazing fiscal and related policy matrix was evolving, the powers of the federal 
government were circumscribed by a division of power regime then more favourable to 
the States. 
In a comprehensive paper, Gumley and Stoianoff set a strongly detailed discussion 
of the relevant Australian experience within a helpful outline of the major international 
agreements related to GHG emissions and climate change.   The chapter also includes an 
                                                 
43 Applegarth, P., “The Work Choices Case: Corporations Power Aspects”, (paper presented at 
Constitutional Law Conference 2007, Gilbert & Tobin Centre of Public Law, University of New South 
Wales), http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/publications/papers/docs/2007/153_PeterApplegarth.pdf , June 
13, 2010.  
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 informing discussion of the long-debated comparative merits of Pigouvian-tax based 
systems compared to Coase-based emissions trading systems.44 The chapter also 
discusses the basic market-based trading systems: cap and trade versus baseline and 
credit.  
The history of Australia’s initial sceptical approach to the Kyoto Protocol is 
explained as is Australia’s later ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, following a change of 
federal government, in 2007.  Within a year of this ratification, the new Rudd 
Government had released the  “Garnaut Report” and then a White Paper which set out the 
design features for comprehensive emissions trading scheme.  From this emerged, in May 
2009, a set of bills to enact the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS).  The Upper 
House of the Australian Parliament (the Senate) where the Rudd Government did not 
have a majority, rejected the CPRS twice, In August 2009 and again in December 2009.  
Subsequently the government announced that further consideration of the CPRS would 
be postponed to 2012 – until after the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol commitment period. 
The authors explain that the CPRS had broad coverage and sound international 
integration. But it was also noteworthy (and heavily criticized by many) for its significant 
concessions to major existing CO2 generators. 
In the latter part of the chapter, the authors set out the astonishing assortment of 
entrenched – mainly tax-related – impediments to any reforms designed to deal with 
GHG emissions in Australia.   What emerges is an immensely complex mix of primarily 
federal but also State sourced taxes, charges and tax expenditures which all have, at least 
in part, environment-related impact.  The Garnaut Report flagged that it was important 
that this thicket of barriers to reform be addressed.  Briefly, special concessions in the tax 
regime for real estate investment; employer provided cars and rural fuel tax credits have 
created tax driven incentives for activities which all bolster GHG emissions.  Predictably, 
most of these long-established concessions have well organized, politically vocal, lobby 
groups focused on resisting all measures which might reduce the perceived benefits.   
                                                 
44 Pigouvian systems (already discussed) simply put, aim to internalize “external costs” by imposing a 
balancing tax or charge on, for example, polluting externalities, see Pigou, op.cit.; and Baumol, W. J. and 
Oates,W. E. “The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment,” Swedish Journal of 
Economics, Volume 73, 1971, page 42. The foundations for a property rights / trading based system for 
addressing the problem of externalities is commonly traced to the 1960 seminal article by Robert Coase 
where he urges reliance on market-based mechanisms, see Coase, R., “The Problem of Social Cost,” 
Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 3, 1960 page 1. 
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 Tax expenditures, measures embodied in tax legislation which reduce or forgo 
certain taxes to encourage certain behaviour have been with us for many decades.  A 
long-standing example which can be found in most tax systems is allowing a deduction 
from income for gifts made to certain, recognized charities.  As the authors explain, tax 
expenditures in Australia now cost the public purse over A$100 billion – or 8.5 per cent 
of GDP.  Worse still, Australia continues to lack robust institutional means to highlight – 
and provoke proper examination of – the detailed high cost of these massive concessions. 
A generous view of the tale told in this chapter is that tackling GHG emissions in 
Australia remains a work in progress.  A less charitable view is that reforms designed to 
tackle climate change in Australia are very badly bogged down in a rather vast swamp 
which marries a complex (and combative) political system with a tax system notable for 
its awesome intricacy. 
The authors conclude with an outline of some lessons which can be drawn from the 
relevant Australian experience in the area of green taxation.  First the attempts to achieve 
GHG reductions using voluntary or persuasive mechanisms simply have not worked in 
Australia.  Next introducing market-based measures (such as the CPRS) can be extremely 
difficult where one is trying to mesh that with a complex tax system. Almost certainly, 
highly organized and numerous vested interests will organize to protect their favourable 
patch within the existing tax regime.  Finally, few parts of any given tax system are more 
deserving of forensic scrutiny than tax expenditures – yet, for the most part, such 
expenditures thrive year after year far removed from mainstream political scrutiny.  
Specific measures, noted in the chapter, can tackle this quite central tax design problem, 
however.   
In summary, Australia stands out more than it should, perhaps, as an example of 
how to build a tax regime that combines high compliance costs, immense complexity and 
deeply embedded barriers to reform.  It is worth remembering, however, that, despite this 
reality, Australia still managed to achieve a high degree of comprehensive tax reform 
based around the introduction of GST just over a decade ago. 
2.9 New Zealand 
In certain ways, the final chapter in this book is particularly significant.  New 
Zealand is comparatively small in terms of both population (4.3 million approximately) 
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 and also area (around 270,000 square kilometers) and it is more geographically isolated 
than any other part of the developed world.45  Yet as Shelley Griffiths (University of 
Otago) shows in her informative chapter, New Zealand has, since the 1980s, completed a 
remarkable level of taxation policy reflection and reform and this process has included 
significant deliberation about the role of green taxation.  Although, once again, local 
political-economy factors have deeply shaped this reform process, the ongoing New 
Zealand “fiscal experiment” has produced statements of policy principle and broad policy 
commentary which are of general significance. 
No other developed jurisdiction has completed so much recent remaking of their tax 
regime as New Zealand.  Being small, stable and relatively homogenous helps explain 
some of why this is so.  Some key political-economic turning points also need to be 
noted, however.  In the immediate post World War Two period, New Zealand grew 
increasingly prosperous – but off a narrow base.  Most of all, it relied on its highly 
efficient agricultural export sector to power the economy – plus (like in Australia) a raft 
of protectionist subsidies and other measures which helped to spread the prosperity 
within a highly controlled, internal economy.   
The economic wheels began to “wobble badly”, however, when the largest export 
market, the UK finally joined the European Common Market (EEC) in 1973.46  To make 
matters worse, this happened just as the First Oil Shock, arising from the Arab Oil 
Embargo hit, following the Yom Kippur War in 1973.47  New Zealand was severely 
distressed by the resulting huge increase in the price of oil: it had no significant, known 
petroleum resources and its geographic isolation made it heavily reliant on access to 
                                                 
45 New Zealand is located some 2,000 kilometres southeast of Australia – which itself is regarded as being 
comparatively separated from the rest of the developed world, especially. 
46 Nixon, C. and Yeabsley, J., “Overseas trade policy - New Zealand, Britain and the EEC” in Te Ara - the 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand, http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/overseas-trade-policy/4, June 14, 2010.  
Various initial concessions were negotiated with the EEC (a predecessor of the EU) but these faded with 
time: the UK took 53% of all New Zealand (almost all agricultural) exports in 1960.  This figure dropped to 
36% in 1970 and around 5% by 2007. Ibid. 
47 For a well regarded account of the political and economic history of the global oil industry, see Yergin D, 
The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, Simon & Schuster, 1991.  This book covers the 
period from 1850 to 1990, with significant analysis of both the First Oil Shock brought on by the 
unsuccessful Arab Coalition attack on Israel in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the Second Oil Shock in 
1979, which followed from the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in early 1979. 
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 long-distance transportation.  These and related experiences fairly swiftly (in political-
time) lead to a radical re-thinking of the fundamentals of the New Zealand economy.48 
The old (UK-dependant) economic model was almost entirely rejected.  This had 
wide-ranging effects, not least for the New Zealand taxation system.  The new “tax 
mantra” which remains determinative today is that New Zealand should stay committed 
to a “broad-based, low-rate” tax system.  The main focus of the reform process was on 
broadening the tax base and lowering marginal rates of tax, as Shelley Griffiths notes.  
The three main tax bases were defined as personal income, company income and goods 
and services consumption (New Zealand introduced a GST in 1986 as a component in the 
process of fundamental economic reform).  New Zealand still has no Capital Gains Tax.  
Griffiths goes on to make a critical point: a key feature of the old, explicitly rejected 
system was that the tax system had been widely used, over time, to provide incentives or 
concessions for activities which were seen, over the longer term, to have social or 
economic merit.  But as the reform process gathered momentum, a powerful belief 
established itself, that any use of the tax system as a primary policy tool to try and foster 
or reward particular behaviour had, in future to be approached with extreme caution.  
Almost all such past measures were seen to have failed the now critical test of “tax 
efficiency”.  They also did not measure up well according to the modern tests of tax 
simplicity and tax equity. 
There have been two major government initiated, committee-based reviews of the 
New Zealand tax system, post reform in 2001 and 2009.  The first committee, the 
McLeod Committee, released its final report in 2001, shortly before New Zealand ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol (in 2002).  The committee knew that ratification was likely and it 
recommended the introduction of a broad-based carbon tax, as the key measure to allow 
New Zealand to meet its Kyoto Protocol obligations (related to controlling GHG 
emissions).  The carbon tax, which was to be revenue neutral, was felt to provide a better 
approach than relying on a cap and trade, Emissions Trading System (ETS).  As it 
happens, the committee specifically rejected the use of widely applied eco-taxes and 
behaviour modification taxes in general.  They failed, above all, the crucial tax efficiency 
                                                 
48 The Treasury, “Final Report - Tax Review 2001”, October 24, 2001, 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/reviews-consultation/taxreview2001/taxreview2001-report.pdf, 
June 14, 2010.  Pages 5 – 17 describe the pre-1984 regime and the changes to it. 
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 test, it was argued.  Such taxes were, by now, seen to be “tainted” by their close 
association with the pre-1980s policies which, over several decades, had help create an 
economy which grimly evolved, in the eyes of many, into a complex, protected, failure. 
The government, acting on this recommendation, finalized the details of the 
proposed new, general carbon tax by 2005.  Serious difficulties with implementation 
swiftly emerged.  Because of the continuing high efficiency (and international 
competitiveness) of the agriculture sector, New Zealand relies more than most any other 
developed economy, on animal-based exports.  The very high populations of sheep (33 
million) and cattle (10 million) mean that animal generated methane makes up a 
remarkable high, 35 per cent of all New Zealand’s GHG emissions.  The fervent 
opposition of the powerful farming industry resulted in the carbon tax proposal being 
modified to exempt methane emissions from animals.   
A new, inter-departmental review committee was formed in 2005.  Its deliberations 
led it to conclude that, for a range of reasons, the previously rejected ETS option was 
now the best way forward.  By the end of 2005, the government announced that they 
were not going to proceed with the carbon tax after all.  Since the enactment of the ETS 
in 2008, it, too, has come in for much review and criticism.  Now a number of significant 
stakeholders are arguing far a carbon tax once more: a tax based system is more certain 
and predictable, they say. 
New Zealand is a unitary (non-federal) state.  It has a British-style, parliamentary 
system of government.  It also only has a single house within the parliament.  All these 
features suggest that, institutionally, policy development and implementation should be 
able to proceed more smoothly than in other jurisdictions with more complex, democratic 
political structures.  However, in 1996 (following a referendum) the previously used 
“First Past the Post” (FPP) voting system (which strongly favoured the two largest 
parties) was replaced by what is known as a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting 
system.  Since then, New Zealand has had a series of coalition governments.  This has 
made policy implementation subject to much greater negotiation and, normally, 
significantly more difficult to implement than was the case when the FPP system 
prevailed.  A further referendum asking whether the current MMP system should 
continue and, if not, what might replace it, is now planned. 
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 New Zealand has, over the last three decades, provided a “working laboratory study” 
of real tax reform being developed and applied – and revised.  One thing the New 
Zealand, real-life tax policy experience suggests is that you can always rely on the “Law 
of Unintended Consequences” to apply itself to any and every reform initiative.  In other 
words, those pursuing reform should expect outcomes (both adverse and sometimes 
positive) not originally planned for and be ready to react in a sound and timely way. 
There looks, also, be a message about the wisdom of using past experience to close 
off, too quickly, options for today and a possible further message about the need to allow 
sufficient time for reform initiatives to take full root and have a settled effect.  
 
3.0  PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
It is clear both from the comparative input and direct discussion in this book that 
Mainland China and Hong Kong each badly need to build and deploy superior policies to 
deal with an array of immense environmental challenges including GHG emissions.  
The serious faltering of the globalized, emissions trading model favoured in the 
Kyoto Protocol, especially post-Copenhagen, has led to policy makers around the world 
taking a fresh look at alternative strategies for tackling massive and serious, 
environmentally bad behaviour.49   
Green taxation does not provide any sort of one-stop solution for dealing with GHG 
emissions.  Nor can we hope that it will single-handedly stop and then reverse the 
collective human behaviour responsible for degradation of air and water quality, for 
example, across the globe.  Green taxation can play a significant role in helping to meet 
these challenges, however.  That this is now more widely recognized, after Copenhagen, 
is a good thing.   
The jurisdictional reviews in the following chapters are valuable and varied.  They 
offer a wide range of comparative perspectives which can help inform green taxation 
policy development and implementation in East Asia. 
                                                 
49 Following the completion of the UN Climate Conference in Cancun, Mexico, in December, 2010, 
restrained optimism has emerged that the UN negotiating process related to GHGs and climate change has 
regained some level of rehabilitated acceptance.  See, for example: “Back from the Brink”, The Economist, 
December 18, 2010, page 113 and “China Plays a Quiet Hand but Some Good Cards at Cancun”, Sunday 
Examiner, page 4. 
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It is worth noting that our authors show how, ultimately, tax policy is always closely 
shaped by local political, economic and social circumstances.  For example: 
x What sort of basic political structure is in place – to what degree does it add layers 
of complexity to high level decision making?   
x What are the embedded economic interests – and how strong are they in terms of 
shaping overall public policy?   
x What sort of timeframes are realistic for testing out new green taxation policies?   
x What sort of green taxes look to be core required taxes? 
x How can green taxation policies best be integrated with other, related, regulatory 
measures.? 
x What sort of earmarking or hypothecation of green taxation revenues should be 
looked at? 
The following chapters present many good lessons about what to do – and what 
not to do – as these and other related questions are being addressed.  The ensuing 
deliberations also often foreshadow a need to expect the unexpected once new green 
taxation policies are put into place – and make ready to respond swiftly - and 
thoughtfully - when this happens. 
 
